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 Abstract. This paper is intended to analyze the challenges and consequences of 
the integration of Western Balkans to the European Union. Specifically, in the 
first case, challenges of this integration path and in the second case the 
consequences as a result of eventual stagnation in this path. For more than a 
century, the Western Balkans region has been seeking its way of European 
transformation. The region remains in the agenda of European Union expansion, 
but even after two decades of promises, the integration of Western Balkan 
countries to EU is not certain. The integration journey is first of all closely 
connected to building the institutional capacities, adoption of laws, rules, norms 
and European behavior in the domestic policymaking. Therefore, the challenges 
are converted into obstacle or inability to the establishment of values, identity, 
institutional and social aspects in the Western Balkan countries, whereas the 
consequences are reflected as derivatives of failure to accomplishing the 
membership of the region to EU. Based on the research conducted on this issue, 
this study argues that such challenges as lack of rule of law, high levels of 
corruption and organized crime are derivatives of historical legacy and political 
elite efforts to capture the state or dominate certain state resources, as well as 
of the EU approach towards this region. This study is important particularly in 
this aspect and unequivocally presents the common and separate challenges of 
the Western Balkans towards integration into the European Union. Along with 
this realistic presentation, the consequences themselves appear which first of all 
are not only to the detriment of the Western Balkans. 





Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Central 
and Eastern Europe were pervaded by a democ-
ratic change wave which in turn culminated with 
the accession into the European Union (EU) in 
the period 2004–2007. The countries of the 
Western Balkans (WB) experienced a different 
fate from the Central and Eastern Europe coun-
tries. In the nineties of the previous century, 
these countries experienced consequent wars 
and destabilization politics whose origin may be 
sought in the historical legacy of the countries in 
the region, in the strategic decisions of the politi-
cal elites and in the economic crisis that pre-
vailed in the region during those years. All this 
disruptive situation resulted, on the one hand, 
from the weakening of the state, consequently 
the lack of rule of law, high levels of corruption 
and organized crime, extensive patronage and 
informality networks [2], and on the other due to 
the lack of a European perspective (in the 1990s, 
the EU was engaged in this region mainly in hu-
manitarian activities), as well as doubling the 
European policy between stabilization and de-
mocratization towards the region [6, 8, 40]. Since 
the first initiative of the EU towards the region, 
along with the democratization, another very 
important dimension has been the stabilization. 
Such approach from the EU has been criticized by 
many scholars, who consider that the EU has fa-
voured the second dimensions to the detriment 
of the first. This the EU behaviour towards the 
region has led to the use of the term stabilocracy 
by some scholars [7] to describe the political sys-
tems of WB countries. A stabilocracy according to 
Florian Bieber [8]”, means ‘a regime that is char-
acterized by considerable deficiencies in the as-
pect of democratic governance, but it enjoys ex-
ternal legitimacy providing assumed stability’. 
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For Antoinette Primatarova and Johanna Deimel 
[41], a stabilocracy ‘ensures external stability, 
but internally it sways between democracy and 
autocratic tendencies’. So, stabilization has two 
main features: one is the external support or le-
gitimacy that is provided by the EU/EU countries 
as a result of the promise of developing democ-
ratic reforms, but above all, the promise of main-
taining regional stability, while the other is the 
derivative of the former. The EU approach to the 
region, respectively the external legitimacy that 
local actors benefit from European countries, has 
left their way to adopting undemocratic and au-
thoritarian power-holding and preservation 
practices “as discussed by Bieber [7, 8]” by utiliz-
ing democratic ways. Today ‘autocrats in the 
Western Balkans rule through informal power 
structures, state capture by ruling parties, pa-
tronage and media control’ [5]. In their overall 
nuances and features and contexts, more or less 
political systems in the WB countries are defec-
tive democracies [37], respectively competitive 
authoritarians [33]. All this context is also re-
flected in the February 2018 strategy ‘A credible 
enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU 
engagement with the Western Balkans’, where 
the European Commission distinguishes the 
main political challenges WB countries are facing 
in their path towards EU membership. These 
challenges include: rule of law, fundamental 
rights and good governance, strengthening of 
democratic institutions, economic re-
form/creation of a competitive economy, fight 
against corruption and organized crime as well 
as resolving the bilateral problems and deepen-
ing the regional cooperation [18]. 
 
Aim and objectives of the study 
The main goal of this study is to identify the main 
political challenges WB countries are facing on 
their path towards EU membership and elabora-
tion thereof. Another goal of this study is the dis-
solution or the dismantling of the consequences 
that would diverge for the EU as well as for the 
WB countries in case of failure of this region to 
get the membership in the EU. This way, the ob-
jective of the study is twofold. On the one hand, it 
is aimed at identifying and analyzing the political 
challenges faced by WB countries in their path of 
approximation and their ultimate membership in 
the EU. The other objective is focused ad disman-
tling the consequences deriving from non-
membership of WB countries to the EU, both for 
the region and for the EU itself. 
 
Research questions  
1. What are the WB countries challenges on their 
path towards membership in the EU? 
2. What consequences would the EU and the WB 
region face in case of non-membership of these 
countries in the EU? 
 
Methodology 
For research purposes, author used the compara-
tive method applied in case studies. Referred to 
Bob Matthews and Liz Ross: ‘Comparative re-
searches often use the multiple case study model, 
which allows for in-depth study of each case, and 
aims to explain similarities and differences be-
tween cases’ [36]. This way, the level of analysis 
in this study is twofold. On the one hand, we 
compare not only the challenges of the WB re-
gion on the path to EU membership, but also the 
disputes leading to emergence of these chal-
lenges, while on the other hand, we analyze and 
compare the consequences that would arise for 
the WB and the EU countries in case of non-
membership of this region. The research strategy 
used to develop empirical research is the qualita-
tive case study. The approach of case studies al-
lows us to deeply analyze the challenges of the 
WB region. Inter alia, according to Robert K. Yin 
[51], a case study is first and foremost an ‘em-
pirical investigation investigating a contempo-
rary phenomenon within its real-life context, es-
pecially when boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clear’. Thus, the empirical 
analysis covers the whole spectrum of national 
cases in the WB region, focusing on the will of the 
political elites and the role of historical legacy 
from the 1990s, respectively the challenges that 
have caused the occurrence of these two factors 
on the path to the EU membership. This variety 
of empirical cases enables us to compare the 
challenges between countries and contexts. To 
respond to research questions, this study is 
based on existing literature and sources such as 
European Commission reports, OSCE/ODIHR re-
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Theoretical framework: From Balkanization to 
Europeanization: The multi-level process of WB 
integration in the EU  
The 90s of the last century were dramatic for the 
WB region. On the one hand, the inter-ethnic con-
flicts broke out leading to the violent disintegra-
tion of Yugoslavia, while on the other side Alba-
nia's 1997 plunge into riots led to almost decline 
of the state. All these events, in the literature, 
were reflected in terms such as 'delayed transi-
tion', 'double transition' to the term 'Balkaniza-
tion', which means fragmentation or division of 
the whole into small pieces. However, the term 
'Balkanization' opposes the concept of Europe-
anization, which primarily implies integration, 
respectively referred to Claudio Radaelli [42], 
Europeanization has to do with a process of: ‘a) 
construction, b) diffusion, c) and institutionaliza-
tion of formal and informal rules, procedures, 
policy models, styles, ways of doing things and 
common norms or beliefs that have been estab-
lished and consolidated at the EU policy level, 
which are then included in the logic of local dis-
course, identity, political structures and public 
policy ‘. In this way, Europeanization emerges as 
a theory which first of all investigates the impact 
the EU has on the internal change of states, which 
is generally influenced by the three dimensions 
of politics: policy, politics and polity [14]. Impacts 
on the internal change of states are exercised by 
the EU through the mechanisms of socialism, ex-
ternalities, imitation and first of all and foremost 
through the conditioning mechanism [45]. Ac-
cording to Tanja A. Borzel [9], ‘conditionality can 
have a decisive influence on the readiness of 
countries to meet the EU standards and to en-
force its obligations ‘. However ‘1) internal re-
forming elites should be able to prioritize the EU 
requirements and 2) functional state institutions 
should be able to coordinate and carry out field 
reforms’[15] However, in the WB region, both 
dimensions have shown to be incapable of sup-
porting and implementing the Europeanization 
process. On the one hand, political elites are inef-
fective, corrupt, self-interested in capturing the 
state or certain state segments or sources, so 
generally reformist elites have seemed weak to 
undertake reforms and radical changes [14, 1, 7]. 
On the other hand, weak administrative and hu-
man capacities (human resources tend to mi-
grate abroad), extensive patronage networks, 
historical legacy and other illnesses make the 
process of WB Europeanization seem to be 
among the most difficult [1, 4]. All this context 
and experience with past enlargements has 
pushed the EU to undertake a new expansion ap-
proach that "has transformed the standard ex-
pansion policy, which was previously applied to 
candidates” [15] Different from the Central and 
Eastern Europe countries, where:  
 
‘conditionality was an integral part of the integra-
tion process, designed as an instrument to force 
candidate countries to meet the legal, economic 
and technical requirements of EU membership in 
the Western Balkans, the EU used conditioning at 
a very early stage’ [13]. 
 
So we have a move from what is known as ‘Euro-
peanization through enlargement’ [14] to ‘Euro-
peanization before accession’ [13]. However, 
unlike the Central and Eastern European coun-
tries, the process of Europeanization in the WB 
region spans a broader range of issues ranging 
from ‘security and peacebuilding, border issues, 
reconstruction and development, and the transi-
tion agenda, to the post-communist associa-
tion’ [1]. So in WB's case, we are dealing with a 
multidimensional process of transformation in-
volving the post-communist, post-conflict and 
post-nationalist transformation’ [15]. Through-
out this multiple processes of transformation, the 
focus of the analysis of this study will be the will 
of the political elites, respectively the response of 
local stakeholders to these challenges and the 
role of the political heritage of the 1990s in the 
integration process.  
 
Challenges of WB Countries on Their Path towards 
Membership in the EU 
Historical Legacy from the First Transition: Re-
sponses of Elites to it  
In the WB region, unlike the experiences of Cen-
tral Europe and Baltic countries, the communist 
regimes were replaced, and somewhere they 
were transformed into competitive authoritari-
anism, the legitimacy of which was different. 
While in Albania the promise of building democ-
racy and raising prosperity was the main legiti-
mizing premise of the regime in Serbia, national-
ism and nationalist mobilization served as the 
main weapon for the legitimacy of the commu-
nist elites now transformed into a nationalist. 
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However, due to the failure to meet these agen-
das, in the late 1990s most of these regimes 
broke down almost throughout the entire WB 
region, but they left behind them a political leg-
acy that turns out to be destructive, not just for 
democracy but also for the state's capacity and 
capabilities to act. Referring to Othon Anastsakis, 
there are five legacy dimensions from the transi-
tion of the 1990-ties that the WB countries are 
facing. These areas include personal clashes; na-
tional and ethnic agendas; high-level corruption; 
people's discontent [2]. 
Personal Clashes: Personalization of politics and 
political battles – is a characteristic not only of 
the first transition but also to what is known as a 
second transition. The failure to initiate a transi-
tion by agreement and then the failure to reach a 
consensus on the modalities of transition led to 
the fragmentation of the political scene, namely 
its polarization. Consequently, this situation led 
to the failure to establish strong and stable insti-
tutions and incited the creation of undetermined 
ideological agendas and paved the way for per-
sonal ambitions [1]. All this resulted in the con-
centration of power in the hands of individuals, 
respectively led to the establishment of presiden-
tial; semi-presidential political systems.  
 
‘The establishment of presidential or semi-
presidential political systems and the limited im-
pact of controls and balances allowed personal 
policies to develop and root themselves in the po-
litical process of most countries, whereby power-
sharing and co-existence agreements became a 
personal struggle for power and political survival’ 
[2]. 
 
Even after the break-up of these regimes and the 
constitution of parliamentary systems, polariza-
tion between political forces, respectively be-
tween leaders, is present. Referred to Valerie 
Bunce [11], polarization resulted to be harmful 
for the political competition. Political competi-
tion is one of the basic conditions for holding free 
and fair elections, yet polarization undermines it, 
and thus violates the elections, which are the ba-
sic principle of democracy. Such election prob-
lems that cause distortion of election results such 
as phantom voter turnout or inaccuracy of voter 
registers, threats and pressure on voters, and 
vote buying, bias or favouring some parties in 
coverage of electoral activities by the media, non-
eligibility between state and electoral activities, 
use of state resources for electoral purposes, 
multiple vote, political influence on the Election 
Commission [31], are present in all WB countries. 
All these problems are a derivative of polariza-
tion, which translates into unspecified political 
behaviour or extreme positions simplified in a 
fierce struggle for power, which then promotes 
competition, respectively personal political ambi-
tions for seizing and controlling state resources 
to raise and maintaining dominant positions on 
the political scene. The entire such situation cre-
ates a suitable habitat for networks of patronage, 
nepotism, corruption as well as organized crime. 
However, despite the similarity in this aspect, the 
trajectories of rising to dominant positions, or 
even the decline of these positions of certain el-
ites has been different amongst WB countries. 
While in Serbia, with the fall of Slobodan Mil-
osevic's power, between the coalition partners, 
the Democratic Party of Serbia (Demokratska 
Stranka Srbije: DSS) of Vojislav Kostunica and the 
Democratic Party (Demokratska Stranka: DS) of 
Zoran Djindjic and later Boris Tadic began a 
fierce competition for dominating the political 
stage and the state resources [43]. This competi-
tion was won by the DS as a result of the broad 
international support it enjoyed, thanks to its im-
age of a liberal Pro-European party. Neverthe-
less, as Florian Bieber [7] expresses, the DS re-
formists turned to be only: ‘builders of institu-
tions hesitating [..., who] instead of decisively de-
capitating undemocratic practices, continued to 
rely on them and often did not want to 
strengthen the independence of the institutions 
and the Constitution‘. This hesitation of DS re-
formists was condemned in the 2012-2013 elec-
tions, which in power brought the Serbian Pro-
gressive Party (Srpska Napredna Stranka: SNS) 
of Aleksandar Vucic, who is the dominant politi-
cal figure in Serbia, whose power is compared to 
that of Slobodan Milosevic in the 90-ties[48]. So 
in Serbia, the trajectory has gone from the domi-
nance competition to the total domination of 
Aleksandar Vucic.  
In Albania, the transition since its beginnings has 
been followed by an extreme polarization be-
tween the main political forces of the Democratic 
Party (Partia Demokratike: PD) and Socialist 
Party (Partia Socialiste: PS) whose effects have 
touched the vital functions of the state, thus un-
dermining the capabilities and capacity of the 
state because of their inrush with party militants. 
However, despite that, no party in Albania has 
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managed to maintain dominance for more than 
eight years. Milo Djukanovic's dominance con-
tinues in Montenegro as a result of a combination 
of internal factors, such as ethnic divisions on the 
basis of which clientele and external networks 
have been organized. Milo Djukanovic and his 
party machine have profiled themselves as a 
Western party, while on the other side there are 
pro-Russian opposition parties in such a situa-
tion. In Northern Macedonia after a decade-long 
dominance of Nikola Gruevski, which in the 
European Commission's report of 2016 was con-
sidered a seizure of the state, which had the 
negative impact ‘on the functioning of democratic 
institutions and key societal areas’, the change 
came in the 2016 election, where Zoran Zaev's 
SDSM managed to form the government, while 
the latter was elected prime minister. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina presents the most complicated case 
in the WB region due to how the state is organ-
ized and functioning. The organization and func-
tioning, respectively the division of the country 
on an ethnic basis and the institutionalization of 
ethnicities have created a habitat suitable for 
ethno-nationalist parties to exercise control over 
the ethnic entities to which they belong. In this 
way, in Bosnia and Herzegovina we are dealing 
with feudalism of power, where each ethnic-
nationalist party exercises control over its feud. 
This way of exercising power shows that al-
though there is a crucial division in Bosnian poli-
tics, Bosnians, Serbs and Croats have a similar 
vision of "completely patrimonial power domi-
nated by great man [38]. In Kosovo, since the end 
of 2007, the Democratic Party of Kosovo contin-
ues to be in power, which during this time has 
shared power with various Albanian parties and 
with Serbian minority and other minorities, 
however, this party has maintained its dominant 
positions over state resources. 
Nationalist and ethnic agendas – in the 90-ties 
were the core of the political parties’ projects. 
Moreover, these agendas have served as a legiti-
mate basis for certain leaders or parties such as 
in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Northern 
Macedonia. However, with the end of the Kosovo 
conflict, the fall of Slobodan Milosevic's power 
and the signing of the Ohrid Agreement as the 
basis for the end of the inter-ethnic conflict in 
Northern Macedonia, the EU initiated the process 
of transforming this ethnic-nationalist context. 
The process of de-nationalism has the regional 
co-operation as its main mechanism, respectively 
the initiation and deepening of cooperation. 
Through this process and its mechanism, the EU 
aims to create economic and political interde-
pendence between the WB countries and conse-
quently the cultural diversification of the coun-
tries of the region. ‘The importance of regional 
cooperation is highlighted by two main benefits. 
First, it reduces tension and strengthens regional 
stability [...] and secondly, it brings various prac-
tical benefits’ [32]. However, despite this the EU 
investment, the deepening of regional co-
operation is hampered by Serbia’s dispute re-
garding Kosovo and other bilateral and inter-
ethnic problems between and within the coun-
tries of the WB region. Stability and regional sus-
tainability are threatened by ghosts of the past. 
Nationalism continues to be emphasized in Ser-
bia. Today, there are governing parties that ruled 
during Slobodan Milosevic's era, while the latter 
is considered by President Aleksandar Vucic to 
be a great leader with good intentions but poor 
results [12]. So in this way, Aleksandar Vucic 
crosses Slobodan Milosevic for lost wars, but not 
for their commencement. This approach, first of 
all, proves that while ‘conservative and radical 
socialist parties in Serbia change and reform, 
they are always the remnants of the conflicting 
context of the 1990s’ [2], and flirtation or nation-
alist feelings continue to remain one of their ma-
jor dimensions of discourse and politics. In 
Northern Macedonia, after the inter-ethnic con-
flict and the successes of liberal politics, ethnic 
politics continued to be the focus of political pro-
jects. VMRO-DPMNE of Nikola Gruevski, which 
dominated Macedonian politics for ten years, is 
the best illustrative example of this approach. 
During VMRO-DPMNE's governance, populism 
and ethno-nationalism were the two main di-
mensions of leading elite’ policies and discourses. 
This discourse was also reflected in the 2016 
election, when the SDSM's liberal-civil project 
opposed the fears of Nikola Gruevski's nationalist 
rhetoric. 
 
‘During the electoral campaign Gruevski used na-
tionalist rhetoric, relying mainly on the language 
of fear in the sense of redefining and separating 
the state from foreign and internal enemies. This 
rhetoric was often pushed to the extreme, as 
Gruevski alluded to the possibility of a violent con-
flict’ [47]. 
 
This nationalist discourse that fostered fear of 
the other aimed at creating an extreme ethnic 
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polarization that would secure and consolidate a 
government mandate for VMRO-DPMNE. In Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, the Dayton agreement insti-
tutionalized ethnic agendas. The constitution is 
designed and organized in such a way that it dis-
tributes power. However, the basis that has 
served as the foundation for power distribution 
is the ethnic basis. So, all political life in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina today is organized on an ethnic 
basis, including electoral zones. All this has cre-
ated a habitat suitable for continuing and 
strengthening the discourse and nationalist 
agendas which remain the number one prefer-
ence for voters [39]. “Ethno-nationalist political 
parties have dominated the political sphere in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina from the first democ-
ratic elections held in the early 1990s’. The 
dominance of these parties continued even after 
the end of the conflict and the reaching of the 
Dayton Accords: ‘Such a preference for rigorous 
ethnic parties by the BiH electorate has been re-
peated in every election with the exception of the 
year 2000, when the Social Democratic Party 
(SDP), one of the rare examples of multi-ethnic 
political parties in Bosnia, won the elections. So, 
what has happened to Bosnia is not a democratic 
transition, it rather is an ethnocratic transition’ 
[10]. As a result of the dominance of these ethno-
nationalist agendas, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
continues to be a controversial country on the 
one hand from Republika Srpska (Serb ethnicity 
within Bosnia) whose leaders have repeatedly 
repeated the threats of holding a referendum on 
independence, and on the other by Croat ethnic-
ity, who consider that they are discriminated 
against, and in 2000 and then in 2011 they or-
ganized illegal forms of self-government [30]. 
Kosovo similar to Bosnia and Herzegovina con-
tinues to be contested by the local Serb commu-
nity, especially those from the northern part, 
who continue to reject integration in the Repub-
lic of Kosovo, as a result of their instrumentaliza-
tion by the leaders and politics of Serbia, which 
contests and refuses to recognize Kosovo's inde-
pendence. Against Kosovo's statehood, since the 
day of the declaration of independence, Serbia 
has undertaken diplomatic offensives which tend 
to impede its international affirmation and con-
solidation. While in the internal and regional 
plan, this relationship is occasionally accompa-
nied by provocations and tensions that best rep-
resent the unstable situation of the region. We 
would draw attention to some time ago block-
ages of streets by local Serbs through barricades 
or trying to drive in a Serbian train with national-
ist inscriptions in the territory of Kosovo. For re-
solving these disputes, the EU has initiated a dia-
log between the two countries since 2013; how-
ever the dominant agendas in this process con-
tinue to remain ethnic agendas. Even in Monte-
negro, just as in Macedonia, Kosovo and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, party structuring is organized 
on an ethnic basis where Montenegrins are rep-
resented or gathered around the party of Milo 
Djukanovic, while on the other side there are 
Serbian nationalist parties that are in opposition. 
So in general, in the WB region ‘ideologies along 
the right-to-left line remain the second in voter 
preferences, which continue to vote according to 
nationalistic and ethnic agendas’ [2] , only Alba-
nia has shown to be immune from this symptom.  
High Levels of Corruption – which in the begin-
ning of transition has been a major problem for 
WB societies in the region. Rosa Balfour and 
Corina Stratulat [3] discuss a uniform scenario 
involving the political elites of all Balkan coun-
tries. This scenario first assumes that in the mo-
ments of political and economic transformations, 
political elites used the vacuum created so that 
political and economic reforms are compiled in 
accordance with their personal interests and 
status. This strategy proved to be successful in 
many countries, which made it difficult to distin-
guish between politicians, businessmen and mag-
istrates. In these cases, ‘the government acted 
more as a clenched hand than as an invisible 
hand and intentionally induced partial reforms to 
the general goal of seizing the state’. According to 
Othon Anastasakis [2], the beginning of transi-
tion determines its continuation, respectively 
‘early transition years lay the foundations for a 
climate of corruption’. Such a corrupt climate de-
spite its improvement during 2008-2011 (see 
metering indices) has followed and continued to 
dominate policy at the highest level in all WB 
countries. Today the WB region is one of the 
most corrupt in Europe, while the problems lie in 
a wide range of issues identified by the European 
Commission reports. Referring to the European 
Commission's 2018 reports on the WB countries, 
it appears that in terms of the fight against cor-
ruption, countries like Serbia, Albania, Montene-
gro, North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzego-
vina have a level of preparation compared to 
Kosovo, which is defined as a country that is at an 
early stage of preparation and at the same time 
has a level of preparation (see European Com-
mission reports for each country for 2018). 
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These Commission Reports highlight weaknesses 
in the fight against corruption. These issues in-
clude: weak institutional capacities and lack of 
inter-institutional cooperation; Concerning re-
mains the unwillingness of governments to 
strengthen the role and ensure the independence 
of the institutions dealing with the fight against 
corruption; bringing corrupt cases of high politi-
cal levels to justice and confiscating property 
from crime continue to stagnate; the non-
financing of political party financing also contin-
ues to be a problem that requires solutions (see 
European Commission reports for each country 
for 2018).  
 
Political Elites: From the Competition to Domination 
and the State Capture  
The EU's February 2018 strategy towards the 
WB region states, inter alia states that ‘countries 
show clear elements of state capture, including 
links to organized crime and corruption at all 
levels of government and administration, and a 
strong confusion of public and private interests’. 
The capture of the state under Transparency In-
ternational (2009) represents the situation in 
which some powerful persons either institutions 
or groups of individuals shape the political and 
economic environment of a country in their fa-
vour through the instrument of corruption [50].  
 
However: ‘capture of the state can be widely un-
derstood [as well] as disproportionate and unregu-
lated influence of interest groups or decision-
making processes, where particular interest 
groups reach to disseminate laws, policies and 
regulations of the state through such practices as 
illicit contributions paid by private interests for 
political parties and elections, campaigns, parlia-
mentary purchase of votes, purchase of presiden-
tial decrees or judicial decisions, as well as through 
illegal lobbying and rotation appointments’ [35]. 
 
So, in its entirety, the capture of the state is un-
derstood as appropriation or control of state re-
sources by elites, which then use these resources 
either for personal gains or for political gains, 
thus causing the deformation of the democratic 
process [28, 26]. Forms of state capture and cap-
ture types are different, for Lily Evelina Sitouris 
[46] in discussing the type of state capture, the 
emphasis should be on the institutions that are 
the subject of capture and the type of actors that 
aim at capture in the wake of this logic referring 
to Mihaly Fazekas and Istvan Janos Toth [27], the 
capture appears to us to be of two types: local, 
which means entering into a relationship cap-
tured only by some public and private organiza-
tions, thus leaving a certain number of 'islands' 
relatively autonomous and global, which pre-
sents the situation when an elite at the national 
level controls the captured organizations that are 
related to each other. Even in the type of state 
capture provided by Abby Innes [29], the capture 
of the state appears to be of two types: capture of 
the state by the party and capture of the state by 
corporations. The former implies the politiciza-
tion or repopulation of state institutions by po-
litical parties in order to pursue and secure po-
litical monopoly, while the latter is defined as the 
exercise of power by private interests through 
the overthrow of legitimate channels of political 
influence. However, in the case of the countries of 
the WB region, we are dealing with the first type, 
that is, with the capture of the state by the party, 
where after the progress of the early 2000s in the 
construction of independent institutions we al-
ready have a politicization of these institutions 
and party control over them. ‘This reassurance of 
party control is articulated through the erosion of 
independent institutions, the penetration of state 
administration by party members and the use of 
informal mechanisms to provide control ‘[7]. In-
struments used for appropriation or control of 
state resources by the elites are different, how-
ever referring to Arolda Elbasani [16] in the case 
of Albania we are dealing with the capture of the 
state through the mechanism of the judiciary. 
Characteristics similar to that of Albania show all 
WB countries where the functioning and inde-
pendence of the judiciary are seriously violated. 
According to the European Commission's 2018 
reports, WB countries are considered to have 
reached a level of preparation in the judicial sys-
tem field except for Kosovo, which is considered 
to be at an early stage of preparation (see Euro-
pean Commission reports for 2018). However, 
despite the distinctiveness of the rating, all coun-
tries throughout the WB region face similar prob-
lems in establishing the rule of law. Serbia since 
2015 is considered to have achieved a level of 
preparation in the area of judicial system [17], 
but the progress achieved since then has been 
slow. Serbia's justice system continues to suffer 
from political influences; constitution and legal 
framework still leave room for political interfer-
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ence. Pressures on the work of judges and prose-
cutors, as well as commentary on court cases by 
individuals at high political levels remain high. 
Furthermore, government control over the me-
dia and selective justice and impunity continue to 
be serious problems that oppose the establish-
ment of rule of law. In Albania, the justice system 
characterized by profound politicization, biased 
justice, corruption, links to crime and politics, is 
presented as the weakest chain 'Achilles heel' of 
the system throughout the post-communist tran-
sition. To change this situation, a comprehensive 
justice reform has been initiated, with the aim of 
building the institutional and human capacities 
needed to ensure the rule of law. However, the 
speed with which this reform is being imple-
mented and the political environment in which it 
is developing are two of the main concerns for 
the future of this reform and with it the justice 
system in general. 
The justice system in Northern Macedonia, like 
that of Montenegro, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, has the same symptoms emerging in Ser-
bia and Albania. Political interventions and im-
pacts on the justice system, biased justice and 
lack of media freedom, commentary on judicial 
cases by senior government officials, corruption 
and links to organized crime are evident in each 
of these states (see European Commission re-
ports on the year 2018). Thus, in general, the rule 
of law in the WB region remains weak due to the 
lack of willpower of the elites to strengthen the 
justice system, as this would also mean breaking 
the authoritarian practices and informal net-
works. Keeping the justice system weak, the po-
litical elites have succeeded in extending their 
power through corruption, clientelism, nepotism, 
patronage. The flow of state institutions and 
companies from party members is evident in all 
countries of the WB region. Contribution and 
loyalty to the party remain the two main prem-
ises for recruiting new members against whom 
the party has countermeasures that ensure their 
retention, such as the promise of employment 
and advancement, temporary positions, insecu-
rity or fear of losing the job. However, in this en-
tire state capture venture, ethnic divisions also 
contribute to Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Ma-
cedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo, as well as the 
EU's own approach towards the region has its 
contribution too.  
‘EU conditionality not only failed to effectively 
address state capture, but also inadvertently con-
tributes to the consolidation of such processes by 
enabling informal networks to strengthen their 
control over power’ [44]. According to Solveig 
Ritcher and Natasha Munsch, there are three 
causes that transform EU’s conditionality into an 
instrument that helps in consolidation of the 
state capture: Firstly, in the absence of a compre-
hensive legal framework, the external pressure 
to liberalize the markets created favourable con-
ditions or allowed a small political and economic 
elite to generate private benefits and influence 
political decision-making through powerful in-
formal networks; Second, the powerful top-down 
conditionality eliminates almost any discussion 
on the domestic political scene and undermines 
the internal accountability mechanisms [44]. 
However, among other things, the EU's condi-
tionality, especially in the area of rule of law and 
the fight against corruption, has been centred on 
what Jovana Marovic [34], says in quantity by-
passing the quality by creating the right ground 
for governing elites to silence internal oppo-
nents; Thirdly, the interaction between the gov-
erning elites of the WB region countries with the 
EU officials or member states' officials or legiti-
macy benefiting WB's elites and leaders within 
this interaction [44]. 
 
‘The rise of strong Balkan rulers, such as Nikola 
Gruevski (Republic of Northern Macedonia), Milo-
rad Dodik (Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herze-
govina), Milo Djukanovic (Montenegro) and Alek-
sandar Vucic (Serbia), and their party machinery, 
occurred under EU observation and often with si-
lent support and approval. These autocratic 
minded leaders - of course, self-proclaimed as de-
mocratic and pro-European have been able to 
stand unmatched in their domestic political arena 
because there is no democratic acquis to bring the 
monopoly of power, organization of party and 
competition or informal practices’ [49]. 
 
Possible consequences for WB and the EU countries 
in case of non-membership of the region in the 
European family 
First scenario: Escalation of the Situation. Any 
forecast for the integration perspective of WB 
countries in the EU depends on three sets of fac-
tors: internal factors, regional factors and exter-
nal factors or factors within the EU and its mem-
ber states. The geopolitical orientation remains 
the key parameter for WB's integration into the 
EU. Today, when the new world order is facing 
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international terrorism, energy and financial cri-
ses, from the rise of authoritarian regimes and 
their new transcontinental alliances, the WB re-
gion still faces challenges and instability. 
Enlargement policy was and remained the most 
dynamic and successful the EU policy, but in the 
case of WB a hesitation is noticed. Today, even 
after 20 years of direct interference with the in-
ternational community, the security situation in 
the WB region continues to be unstable. This 
situation led by a semi-authoritarian mentality 
leads us toward the premise of a fragile stability, 
with possibilities and potential for further escala-
tion. The consequences of this escalation are se-
rious obstacles to WB's progress towards inte-
gration into the EU. The democratic deficit within 
the EU is another element contributing to this 
situation. Double standards for the same criteria 
are explicit evidence for the escalation of this 
situation. The EU must be clear and straightfor-
ward that such a situation does not fall into the 
ruins of the end of the last century. 
Second scenario: Implication of third actors: Divi-
sion of WB into zones of influence. If regional in-
stability rises due to lack of the EU courage, this 
would make the Balkans fertile land for foreign 
interventions. The Balkans is a competition arena 
between the foreign powers, drawing Russia, 
Turkey and China to a corner of Europe that has 
been largely under the influence of the EU and 
the US since the Yugoslav wars. To keep Russian 
and Chinese ambitions under control, Washing-
ton is ready to work with the EU to protect the 
interests of the West. Enlargement critics are 
right when they say that the quality of democracy 
and the rule of law in the Balkan countries are 
below the EU standards, but the WB needs the 
EU integration to relegate the many problems 
and challenges. The EU is putting as a condition 
for the eradication of organized crime and cor-
ruption, but is cutting funds along with the World 
Bank and other Western lenders for WB coun-
tries, enabling China to fill the void. Meanwhile, 
Balkan diplomacy experts say Russia has worked 
and is working hard to boost the impact on this 
part of Europe. WB is currently an arena of colli-
sions between Russia on the one hand and, on 
the other hand, the US and the EU. In this situa-
tion, the membership of the entire WB in the EU 




Problems such as the lack of rule of law, high lev-
els of corruption and organized crime, misman-
agement, clientelism and nepotism are only de-
rivatives of the irresponsible behaviour of politi-
cal elites, namely the result of personal political 
ambitions for domination and capture of state 
resources. In this way, the political elites are the 
primary challenge in the path of the WB region 
towards the EU, the creation and emergence of 
democratic political elite, which is willing not 
only to transform the region's historical heritage 
but to build democracy and embed European 
values. Among other things, a challenge for the 
region on the journey to joining the European 
family remains the EU's own approach to WB. 
Taking into consideration the stability of the re-
gion, the EU, other than creating the space for 
capturing the state, has, in most cases, even le-
gitimized the capturing leaders. Thus, the democ-
ratization of WB societies remains only a discur-
sive dimension of the leading EU elites. Trans-
formation of this approach and the persistence in 
the democratization of these societies remains 
critical for the future of the WB and the stability 
of the region and even of Europe. In the Euro-
pean Union, where the interests of member 
states dominate, allowing the new members to 
be blocked on their behalf would turn back the 
idea of this European project. In recent years, 
there has been a rise in euro-scepticism and the 
dilemma about enlargement, as member states 
and their citizens have been tired of previous 
enlargements. Yet now there seems to be hope 
for better. Election Results for the European Par-
liament held between 23 and 26 May 2019 have 
removed the dilemma of endangering the Euro-
pean Union's enlargement project with the West-
ern Balkan countries. Pro-European parties have 
taken 80 percent of parliament seats. This is good 
news, because the anti-EU parties that have lost 
the majority are the ones that most opposed the 
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